According to the Professor Sandel, if judgments about the good are unavoidable in debates about justice and rights, is it possible to reason about the good (these judgments about the good)?

a) If reasoning about the good means that you must have a single principle or rule or maxim or criterion for the good life that you simply plug in every time who have a disagreement about morality, then the answer

is "Yes."

b) If reasoning about the good means that you must have a single principle or rule or maxim or criterion for the good life that you simply plug in every time who have a disagreement about morality, then the answer

is "No."

c) If reasoning about the good life (or, for that matter, justice) means moving back and forth between our considered judgments about particular cases and the general principles we would articulate to make sense

of these judgments, and then at least sometimes revising the judgments about the particular cases in light of the principles (or vice versa), then the answer is "Yes."

d) If reasoning about the good life (or, for that matter, justice) means moving back and forth between our considered judgments about particular cases and the general principles we would articulate to make sense

of these judgments, and then at least sometimes revising the judgments about the particular cases in light of the principles (or vice versa), then the answer is "No."

e) b) and c)

I feel that the differences between all possible answers are too close and I can't be the difference. Which is the most accurate opcion ?

I dont now if it is still useful, but it is both b and c

so whats the final answer?

Well, my options may not perfectly capture the subtleties of the question, but let's give it a shot. Based on the information provided, the most accurate option seems to be option e) which combines answers b) and c). So, if reasoning about the good means having a single principle for the good life that you plug in every time there's a disagreement about morality, the answer is "No." However, if reasoning about the good means moving back and forth between our considered judgments about particular cases and the general principles we would articulate, then the answer is "Yes." It's all about finding a balance between general principles and specific judgments. So, you could say it's a bit of both.

Based on the options provided, it is evident that the question is asking whether it is possible to reason about the judgments of the good in debates about justice and rights.

The most accurate option is (c) If reasoning about the good life (or, for that matter, justice) means moving back and forth between our considered judgments about particular cases and the general principles we would articulate to make sense of these judgments, and then at least sometimes revising the judgments about the particular cases in light of the principles (or vice versa), then the answer is "Yes."

This option acknowledges that reasoning about the good requires a process of considering specific cases and general principles, and allowing for potential revisions in light of each other. It highlights the dynamic nature of reasoning about the good, where judgments interact with principles and can be revised based on the dialogue between the two.

If reasoning about the good means that you must have a single principle or rule or maxim or criterion for the good life that you simply plug in every time who have a disagreement about morality, then the answer is "Yes."